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Andrew Read 
Crowdfunding: 
An Empirical and Theoretical Model of Non-Profit Support 
  
 Crowdsourcing, the umbrella term that includes crowdfunding, was introduced as a 
method of outsourcing new solutions for corporate improvement by accessing the ideas of the 
‘crowd’. Crowdsourcing relies upon open innovation using the intelligence of the collective and 
was first defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation, and to expand the markets for external use.”1 Similarly, crowdfunding uses 
the crowd, but focuses on the ability to use a large quantity of individuals to generate capital 
needed to fund a variety of projects/organizations/businesses. Since the innovation of general 
web-based crowdfunding began in 2008, crowdfunding platforms have expanded from the 
small-scale to truly massive enterprises that have seen incredible annual growth. This has 
paralleled the crowdfunding platforms shift from a niche idea to a mainstream funding 
solution.  
Currently, the non-profit sector must allocate a significant portion of its available 
resources to fundraising initiatives to maintain operations. Substantial amounts of time and 
effort are required to secure grants, court donors, and execute fundraising events. 
Fundamentally, one of the greater challenges for non-profits remains reaching a wide audience 
with their message and targeting relevant donors likely to agree with their cause. The 
introduction of crowdfunding platforms in 2009 has produced new ways for non-profits to 
approach funding that will change this outcome. Non-profits can approach crowdfunding as a 
                                                          
1 Scott E. Hartley. Crowd-Sourced Microfinance and Cooperation in Group Lending. 3. 
 
2 
 
new means to find funding from the crowd in an environment that facilitates large amounts of 
small giving. Crowdfunding is allowing non-profits to diversify their funding while also appealing 
to a multitude of possible donors, enhancing their funding potential.  
 
        However, despite all the hype surrounding this new means of fundraising, crowdfunding is 
not a cure-all funding solution when used as a funding tool. There are still growing doubts 
about the inability to effectively ensure quality control, enforce project deadlines, and operate 
transparently on crowdfunding platforms. These concerns have acted to dissuade many from 
utilizing and contributing through crowdfunding platforms. However, recent research put 
forward (Schweinbacher et al. 2010) suggests that non-profit status on individual projects 
provides a much higher success rate and overall funding amount than its for-profit counterparts 
on similar crowdfunding platforms. Individual projects convey that they do not have for-profit 
motives by signaling non-profit status and thereby establishing both trustworthiness and 
confidence in a project’s relative quality with platform contributors. Building on 
Schweinbacher’s research, this current study on crowdfunding platforms explains the theory 
behind the individual project factors that make non-profits more successful than their 
counterparts and uses an empirical evaluation of these factors to validate their effects. 
 
II. Current Literature 
 Predictably, there is very little literature on crowdfunding, and, given the recent 
nature of its development, little has been written on non-profit involvement in crowdfunding 
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platforms. In an earlier study by Wojchiechowski (2009), new methods for acquiring donations 
were advanced by tapping the popularity of social media. The author suggests that web-based 
services present a growing opportunity to identify groups of people who share in the 
company’s or organization’s mission or beliefs. Thereby using social media, non-profits are able 
to reach out to a greater audience and secure a larger base from which to draw donations.  
Crowdfunding initiatives operate under similar conditions that Wojchiechowski 
identified as potentially conducive to a non-profit organization’s donative appeal. Gerber 
(2010) discusses the importance of non-profits in the emerging crowdfunding industry and 
concludes that the emphasis on being in a donative community is one of the major motivators 
for crowdfunding participation. Specifically, crowdfunding supporters of non-profits are 
encouraged by “sympathy and empathy towards the cause, feeling guilty for not giving, and 
strengthening identity and social status.”2 Crowdfunding participation offers the ability to 
browse for a cause that suits individual interests and provides altruistic fulfillment. Moreover, 
Gerber concludes firms can reduce time and transactions costs by becoming involved in 
crowdfunding. Under the umbrella of ‘web 2.0’, or the modern internet interaction, 
crowdfunding offers a safe and convenient way to foster ideas and is significantly easier for 
financial transactions via online payment methods. Similarly, Bons (2008) describes the benefits 
of the internet as a medium for exchange in Open Innovation: The Benefits of Crowdsourcing. 
The internet has tremendous value as a means of connecting with clientele and is both safe and 
easy to use. Her emphasis focuses on the reasons for how ideas are fostered on the medium 
                                                          
2 Metzler, Tobias.  Venture Financing by Crowd Funding. (Norderstet: Bonn Publishing. 2011), 16 
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and how feedback within crowdfunding platforms can spark innovation. One of the values in 
crowdfunding is the ability to express views on the project that are visible on the crowdfunding 
site for both the creator and supporters.  
The first empirical study on the crowdfunding industry by Schweinbacher et al. (2010) 
cemented the value of non-profit crowdfunding with the study’s conclusion that non-profit 
projects generally secure more funding than general for-profit projects. The study controls for 
individual project characteristics and concludes non-profit status by itself can induce greater 
participation. These characteristics range from the category of individual projects (e.g. art, film, 
product, education, etc.) to the investment form for the project returns (e.g. active investment, 
passive investment, or donation), as well as a few others. The empirical analysis pinpoints 
certain drivers of project success of crowdfunding platforms as it relates to what type of project 
or project’s industry characteristics produce the greatest benefits. The study finds that types of 
investment produce very little effect on incentives to participate and support a project. In most 
cases, people are more concerned with funding an idea with which they agree rather than 
receiving a return on their investment. This suggests that people view general crowdfunding as 
a donation based enterprise and might explain why non-profits do significantly better. The 
conclusion assesses that non-profits generally do better than other alternatives, yet the 
conclusion could be pushed farther in terms of why non-profits stand to do better on 
crowdfunding platforms. The emphasis of this study is to pick up where Schweinbacher’s study 
left off and determine non-profit donative components. 
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III. Theory 
 Crowdfunding represents the drivers of individual non-profit project success in line with 
general scholarship on the foundations of non-profit donative giving. Non-profits have long 
exemplified the notion that signaling their status makes it significantly easier to generate 
capital because their emphasis isn’t on the desire for profits. This important characteristic, as 
the Hansmann (1980) study concludes, is a general indicator of quality and is a form of contract 
failure. Consumers are unable to achieve perfect information in most markets and must make 
do with how they perceive certain companies and organizations. Predictably, companies that 
are profit-oriented tend to put disproportionate effort into achieving profits at the expense of 
the quality that consumers expect. Consumers will respond by attaching meaning to non-profit 
status and are more willing to fund projects that display this. 
 The corollary to signaling theory is the general donative theory that necessitates the 
motivations for why people give. The driving force behind non-profit giving on crowdfunding 
platforms can be explained both by non-profit signaling and the extra motivations that 
accompany a donation. Konow (2006) offers a theoretical understanding of donative giving that 
fits well here. The author determines that a combination of altruism and the “warm glow” of 
giving are responsible for donations. People will gain utility through the betterment of the 
recipient of the donation and this is the basis of altruism. This is expressed as a relationship 
between two individuals through the donor and the recipient. This relationship is stated as a 
combination of the utility the donor maintains from the portion of potential funds not given to 
the recipient, (X), as well as a function of the endowment the recipient had prior to the 
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donation (e) and the amount the recipient gains (x). The “warm glow” argument further states 
that a donor might donate simply because the act of giving makes the person feel better and is 
simply a function of giving (g(x)). This could mean a person feels an inflated self-worth or a 
variety of other intangible benefits from the donation. Sometimes called impure altruism, the 
“warm glow” is noted as a boost in a person’s sense of selflessness or social responsibility, 
simply in the act of giving. Altruism and the “warm glow” effect combine to form the following: 
U=U(X)+f(e+x)+g(x) 
Crowdfunding platforms utilize both the altruist motive and the “warm glow” motive when it 
comes to non-profit donations. People find that non-profit signaling produces trust that allows 
them to increase their utility for both the altruistic motive and the “warm glow” motive. The 
altruist will feel comfortable in the fact that the money was probably used wisely because of 
the lack of the for-profit motive. This means there is a greater chance the donor’s money 
produced a positive benefit that makes the donor feel better. Secondly, the donor is more likely 
to feel the “warm glow” effect because they have donated within a crowdfunding community 
and can take part in the act of donating online.  
Given this theoretical basis, crowdfunding platforms potentially add an interesting 
element to the equation. Schweinbacher concludes that types of investment do not matter 
which led to the conclusion that crowdfunding supporters do not identify returns on their 
investment as the greatest motivator of participation. However, rewards do matter, as the 
empirical evidence will show. Many crowdfunding platforms instruct prospective projects to 
issue a reward for any form of funding. While a for-profit firm usually uses the reward as a 
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return for pledging funds and is mainly the funded final product, non-profit rewards usually 
comprise an organizational keepsake such as a note or video illustrating where donor funds 
went. The idea is certainly not new and certain non-profits have provided these returns to 
donors in the past. The token usually describes how the donation was used or simply thankes 
the donor. The design is to reinforce the altruist motive by describing exactly where the funds 
were used. Crowdfunding rewards work in a similar manner, yet the reward system is built into 
the major crowdfunding platforms. Almost every project uses rewards and the generally 
physical nature of the return is notable. For example, t-shirts, a common reward, are seen as a 
reward that can be worn to display the donor’s involvement in crowdfunding and act to 
enhance the donor’s social benefits. The non-profit rewards allow crowdfunding donors to feel 
involved in the process and become part of a community. Therefore, to the function of altruism 
and the “warm glow” will be added the rewards that a donor can expect to receive (c(rew)). 
Added to the equation this is represented further: 
U=U(X)+f(e+x)+g(x)+c(rew) 
This provides another theoretical basis for why crowdfunding sites are increasingly popular and 
why non-profits should shift part of their funding efforts to crowdfunding platforms. The 
inclusion of a reward for donors acts as a small additional incentive and can convince 
participation in the platform. 
 Another interesting phenomenon that affects involvement on crowdfunding platforms is 
the use of social screening of projects to establish a type of quality control. Non-profits’ use of 
crowdfunding platforms affords supporters the assurance of a quality project through the use 
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of the “hive-mind”, as well as the interaction of the crowd. Crowdfunding sites operate 
differently from normal donor channels as trending projects appear more commonly to users 
on the web platform. Crowdfunding platforms usually suggest projects that have already 
generated a large amount of attention and this seems to be a method of project endorsement. 
Projects that have already drawn a large number of supporters generally have significant 
quality or a unique idea to generate such funds. Moreover, the trending mechanism on most 
major sites operates by identifying the number of backers as opposed to the amount the 
project has already raised. This acts to sponsor projects that have attained a great deal of 
enthusiasm and not projects overinflated by a couple large donors. Theoretically, the hive-mind 
of the crowd should then be responsible for certain increases above and beyond the general 
merits of the individual project. 
 
V. Data and Methodology 
 The attempt of this empirical model will be to extract which variables can explain the 
funding patterns on crowdfunding platforms. In order to provide an analysis of Crowdfunding 
platforms, two data sets with over 14,000 observations were used to construct a plausible 
model. Surveys were sent out to a number of crowdfunding platforms and two of the largest 
platforms have provided extensive metrics on individual projects. Kickstarter, the most popular 
crowdfunding site, has provided 14,000 projects that contain data on a variety of interesting 
variables. Likewise, the platform Fundrazr has released a data set that should be useful. 
Fundrazr is notable especially because it deals with relatively heavy traffic from non-profit 
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projects. The combination of the two data sets is useful to determine the effects of the 
variables in a regression equation for both the non-profit and for-profit sectors and should give 
balanced estimates. 
  The sample used in the regression needed to be sorted for non-profit status from the 
large list of observations. Once this was completed, a random number generator was used to 
pick certain observations that would be included in the sample. Too produce the regression 
output, projects were combined with 108 observations from for-profit projects and 108 
observations from non-profits. The data was taken from a cross-section between the periods of 
March 2011 to March 2012 and had all concluded their maximum funding period. This means 
that funding had stopped for all observations and had equal periods to attain their funds. 
 
IV. Model 
  The empirical model seeks to explain what causes increases in the dependent 
variable for total funds raised per project by individual project characteristics. The variables 
were put into the ordinary least squares model to determine their validity and ability to explain 
changes in the function. The variables that are expected to make a noticeable impact on the 
overall funding of a project are the following: the age of the creator group backing the launch of 
the project, whether the project is a startup that is using crowdfunding to generate initial 
funds, whether it was a non-profit organization, the number of project backers, and whether a 
reward was offered. The definition of relevant variables can be found in the appendix in Table 
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1. The general equation using these variables to determine the regression statistics were as 
follows: 
RAISED = f(AGE, START, NON, BACKERS, REW) 
The variables used in this equation are hypothesized to explain the majority of the total funds 
raised in a given project. Three separate models were tested with a variety of the variables as 
shown in Table 4, but the current variables seem to provide the best overall modifiers of 
crowdfunding success. 
The dummy variable START determines if the company or idea is completely new and 
has yet to become established. Table 4 indicates a negative correlation with funds raised, which 
is in line with the theory that new firms will tend to send unfavorable signals. Many startup 
projects commonly display their startup status on their crowdfunding description, which would 
act as a signal that should be detrimental to their ability to raise funds. The variable AGE was 
included as well, despite being multicollinear with START. Projects that have a positive value for 
AGE are not going to be start-ups, so the value will be skewed. The decision was made to leave 
AGE in the equation due to the perceived theoretical value of the positive indication that 
greater amounts of organizational experience signals to crowdfunding supporters.  
 The variable REW is a dummy variable that specifies if the project offers a reward or if 
no reward is offered. This variable is usually contingent on which crowdfunding site it was 
placed upon, as rewards are generally encouraged for acceptance on some sites while not 
offered on others. This produced a noticeable early challenge, considering that rewards are 
generally tied to a crowdfunding platform’s rewards policy. This translated to the regression as 
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differences in reward choices became multicollinear, as they are correlated to the 
crowdfunding platform and not the reward choice. However, it seems the results were not 
significantly affected when the data sets for Kickstarter, Fundrazr, and Razoo were compared 
against each other, so multicollinearity was allowed within the regression. The variable REW 
positively correlated to an increase in funds raised with ten percent significance. People should 
be more eager to fund a project that offers a reward as a form of partial compensation for 
giving up part of their endowment. 
The variable NON is a dummy variable that indicates whether the project is a non-profit 
or for-profit. This variable should theoretically be especially significant toward project success 
rate and is expected to carry a positive coefficient. The presence of non-profit status in the 
project description acts as a signal to supporters of the trustworthiness of the project creator. 
This is consistent with the theory of contract failure and why consumers would support a non-
profit over a for-profit. The expectation is that non-profit crowdfunding projects will tend to 
attract a larger percentage of funding and have a higher success rate because of this. After 
consulting Table 3, it was noted that there is a significant correlation between non-profit status 
and the age of the organization and start-up status. Almost no start-up non-profits had success 
utilizing crowdfunding and the sector was instead dominated by larger and more established 
organizations. It appears that start-up non-profits do significantly worse than start-up for-profit 
firms. One possible explanation is the distinctive nature of many of the for-profit start-ups 
while non-profits are perhaps too generic to catch the attention of crowdfunders. In a number 
of cases, donors could simply seek out an older and more established non-profit and direct 
their funds to a similar cause that they see as signaling better usefulness due simply to 
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organizational experience. The variable NON was confirmed in Table 4 as the most significant 
estimator of project funds raised. 
The final two variables will seek to explain the changes in the funds raised by individual 
projects for every unit increase in the other variables, all things held constant. The variable 
BACKER represents the number of people who contributed. Some projects are able to hit their 
target easily and attain success, but this can happen with a few donors who take on the project 
personally. The attempt to measure the signaling that a large number of backers imparts on the 
desirability to donate to a project was measured in the regression. The expected sign of 
BACKERS should thus be positively related to the success of the project. Table 4 concludes that 
the number of backers was significant in explaining increases in the funds raised. The nature of 
crowdfunding encourages many smaller donations and it appears that supporters are more 
willing to donate when it has been accepted by other peers on the platform. 
The model has a number of variables that were considered but ultimately dropped from 
the regression equation. One of the reasons to drop some of the variables considered was the 
potential overlap and multicollinearity numerous variables might involve. Larger numbers of 
variables were less effective in explaining individual changes due to multicollinearity and thus 
inflated the R squared disproportionately. The variables were thereafter slimmed down to the 
current number, attaining an R squared of 41%. 
Indicated in Table 1, the variables that were considered were ultimately dropped due to 
poor fits in the equation. One notable variable considered was LNPER that sought to explain the 
percentage of success, defined as the percentage of funds raised against their funding goal for a 
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given project. One of the quirks of many larger crowdfunding platforms is the reliance on “all or 
none” funding, meaning that a project is required to meet their funding goal to receive any of 
the pledged funds. This is designed to create product control for the sites, as significant support 
will be needed, and thereby acts to require for-profit projects to return on their promises. 
Therefore, the expected sign on LNPER should be positive as a variable beneficial to supporter 
confidence and is defined as the unit increases in project funds raised for every percentage 
increase in the success of the project, all else held constant. However, although the variable 
was useful for explaining the “all or none” funding platform successes, it was of little use for the 
other platforms and individual regressions showed it would skew the results and 
disproportionately modify existing variables. LNPER was subsequently dropped from the 
equation. 
The second notable specification dropped from the equation is the variable UPD, which 
relates to the amount of project interface updates that the creator had produced. Increased 
updates should signal that the creator is invested in interacting with the supporter base to 
produce a better product and/or take suggestions from the user base. This variable seems 
consistent with general signaling theory whereby a project that indicates more updates or was 
more in touch with its supporter base should indicate better quality. This, in theory, should 
produce better results in attracting donors to the cause. In the final regression, the variable was 
dropped due to the high correlation with the amount of backers.  Crowdfunding utilizes the 
ability to interact with backers, so as the amount of backers increases, the project will usually 
add updates to tailor the project to the input of the backers. Therefore, it seems that this 
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variable, while theoretically effective, would be captured in the regression by BACKERS itself, so 
UPD was ultimately dropped. 
 
VI. Analysis 
 The regression equation does a relatively good job of describing the factors that 
influence the amount of funding raised per project and the major implication is that the 
variables were generally statistically significant from zero and could satisfactorily explain the 
changes in project funding.  
The value for REW seen in Table 4 belies the value of the offer to crowdfunding projects. 
People are motivated to participate when they have something to gain from the exchange and 
it gives them a sense of involvement in the process of development. Even in the situations 
where donations are considered, the rewards system seems valuable, as it inspires connection 
to the outcome amongst the supporters. Regressions run between Kickstarter, Fundrazr, and 
Razoo and their disparate rewards systems allowed the conclusion that rewards offers are 
almost universal project funding boosters.   
Likewise, the statistical significance of the variable BACKERS belies the importance of 
the hive-mind and creator interaction for project funding. It is likely that interaction with 
supporters provides substantial signals that the project is well-planned and generally well-
maintained. Crowdfunding users will be more likely to become project supporters when they 
have the reassurance that their funds will be used in an efficient manner that draws from their 
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desire for altruism. If their funds are used well, as increased planning and project maintenance 
would indicate, then their utility gained from altruism would be expected to increase 
accordingly. 
The model did encounter a number of challenges that needed to be corrected before a 
final equation was reached. As occurs on many cross-sectional data sets, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity was a problem. In order to correct for this problem, the regression was run 
with White-test heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors to bring the data in line. The 
correction resulted in the reduction in the significance of a number of variables. However, the 
model seems well-suited to determinants of crowdfunding success and can be used with 
confidence. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
This study conducts one of the first known studies on the crowdfunding industry and the 
first known study specifically on non-profits’ role within them. As such, there are numerous 
policy implications that might exist given the regression explanations. Firstly, crowdfunding 
generally seems to be a benefit to projects and has many advantages that can be explained 
both theoretically and empirically. The policy recommendations to various projects on 
crowdfunding platforms are numerous. One of the most important policy implications from the 
regression is that non-profit status does matter in the presentation to supporters. The success 
of projects seems to be heavily related to the signals it sends out. The results of the regression 
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support the supposition that non-profits can take advantage of the process of market failure 
and the other motives for donating effectively on crowdfunding platforms. 
One of the major challenges to the crowdfunding industry is supporter protection and 
quality control. There is simply little in the way of a project creator taking all the raised revenue 
and not producing a satisfactory final product. Crowdfunding supporters are in essence 
investors on for-profit projects and might see no return and have to endure high risks given 
that project quality is hard to measure as a crowdfunding supporter. It seems that non-profits 
can use a variety of signals to induce higher potential funding for their projects. Crowdfunding 
project creators can use a variety of means to signal to supporters that their crowdfunding 
product is superior. 
Simply displaying non-profit status somewhere in the title or description is the foremost 
and easiest means for a non-profit to signal project quality. Notably, the non-profit status has 
to be easily visible, as most supporters spend a relatively small amount of time browsing 
projects. Secondly, creating physical rewards can produce greater benefits to crowdfunding 
projects than those that choose non-physical options, such as a “thank you” e-mail. Rewards 
are not viewed as returns on investment for non-profits as they usually are for for-profit 
projects and instead are used as a signal of trustworthiness. Supporters use crowdfunding in 
part for the feelings of social benefit the act of donating imparts and many would like to know 
that the money was well-used. Non-profits could do better by using physical rewards to express 
how the funds were allocated. Future empirical studies might be necessary to determine which 
types of rewards could most effectively reward project donors. Finally, non-profits can expect 
17 
 
to do substantially better when the project has been picked up by a critical mass of supporters. 
Non-profits that attract support by using the functions available on crowdfunding platforms like 
the social media function can attract significantly more support. The trending nature of projects 
that achieve many backers and not necessarily large amounts of capital can boost their funding 
potential. 
Non-profits that seek to use crowdfunding platforms can use these signals for their 
benefit and generate substantially more funding than they otherwise would. Crowdfunding 
looks like a promising avenue for non-profit donor strategy given the positive effects that 
signaling on the platforms can induce. Ultimately, it seems crowdfunding is primed as a unique 
means of attracting additional funding for non-profits and signaling is one of the key factors 
that can make crowdfunding a success. 
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Table 1-Variables 
Final Variables 
RAISED = Total funds raised per project in US dollars 
BACKER = The number of supporters who give to a project in its funding period 
START = A dummy variable that will be 1 if the company or organization is a startup and 
0 if it is established 
REW = A dummy variable that will be 1 if the company or organization offers a reward to 
project supporters and 0 if it does not 
NON = A dummy variable that will be 1 if the project held non-profit status and 0 if it 
does not 
AGE= The age of the organization of group receiving crowdfunding funds 
 
Considered Variables 
ORG= A dummy variable that will be 1 if the project is created by an established 
organization and 0 if it is not established 
OUT= A dummy variable that will be one if the project produces a product as its return 
and 0 if it does not 
DON= A dummy variable that will be 1 if the project strictly accepts donations and 0 if it 
does not 
AON= A dummy variable that will be 1 if the crowdfunding platform uses all or nothing 
funding and 0 if it does not. Some crowdfunding platforms return funds to supporters if 
the project target is not met 
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TARGET= The target amount of the project 
UPD = The number of project updates 
RAISED/BACKER= The average amount of project funding per project supporter 
LNPER = Project success rate as percentage written as a logarithm 
 
Table 2-Summary Statistics 
______ Variables________     _  Mean      Standard Deviation____ _ 
     AGE   6.148148        13.13176 
         START  0.481481       0.500818 
            NON   0.5        0.501161 
         BACKERS  139.2963       438.2815 
     REW   0.722222       0.448944 
        
 
 
Table 3-Correllation Matrix 
 
RAISED AGE START NON BACKERS REW 
RAISED 
  1.000000        
AGE 
  0.280989**   1.000000        
START 
-0.383751*** -0.452206***   1.000000     
NON 
  0.425554***  0.424045*** -0.444750***    1.000000     
BACKERS 
  0.231759   0.021366   -0.230390  0.255284*  1.000000   
REW 
  0.187276   0.206400   -0.230860  0.251224*  0.055906  1.000000 
 
Note: Correlation significance is denoted by (*) for 10% significance, (**) for 5% significance, and (***) 
for 1% significance. 
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Table 4-Regression Results 
 
Amount of Funds Raised ($) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
 
1976.32 
(2631.44) 
 
3679.32 
(1146.52) 
6355.44 
(2491.71) 
AGE 
 
-11.17 
(63.39) 
 91.16 
(99.97) 
 
START 
 
-1463.77 
(1402.14) 
 
-3950.81 
(1284.45) 
-7247.29 
(2670.82) 
 
NON 
 
1097.15 
(1713.85) 
 
5323.05 
(1129.03) 
9877.051 
(2658.91) 
 
BACKERS 
 
21.04 
(2.44) 
1.81 
(0.74) 
105.40 
(58.77) 
 
REW 
 
 
 
1083.28 
(835.65) 
2.31 
(1.54) 
 
ORG 
 
348.25 
(1501.04) 
 
  
OUT 
 
-1679.68 
(1421.76) 
 
  
DON 
 
2615.16 
(1986.94) 
 
  
AON 
 
3494.24 
(2079.29) 
 
  
TARGET 
 
0.113 
             (0.0374) 
 
  
UPD 
 
541.20 
(102.61) 
 
41.47 
(14.11) 
 
 
RAISED/BACKER 
 
 8.33 
(12.98) 
 
 
LNPER 
 
 531.65 
(196.12) 
 
 
 
Adjusted R Squared .11 
 
.49 .41 
Number of 
Observations 
216 216 216 
 
 
 
